Iraq Oil Production 2026
Iraq is OPEC's second-largest oil producer at approximately 4.2–4.4 mb/d — and one of its most persistent quota violators. The country's fiscal dependency on oil revenues (~90% of government income), combined with IOC service contracts incentivising maximum output, creates structural pressure to produce above OPEC+ quotas regardless of alliance commitments. In 2026, Iraq continues to navigate the tension between OPEC+ membership obligations and domestic fiscal imperatives.
For OPEC+ context, see our OPEC+ glossary entry. For Iraq's fiscal breakeven, see our fiscal breakeven glossary entry. For IOC contract structures, see our production sharing agreement glossary. For crude oil pricing, see our Brent crude glossary entry.
Major fields and IOC contracts
| Field | Location | Operator(s) | Output (2026 approx.) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rumaila | Basra, south | BP (38.75%) + CNPC (36.75%) + Basra Oil Co. | ~1.3–1.4 mb/d |
| West Qurna 2 | Basra, south | Lukoil (75%) + Basra Oil Co. | ~0.7–0.8 mb/d |
| West Qurna 1 | Basra, south | ExxonMobil (32.7%) + PetroChina (25%) + QatarEnergy + Basra Oil Co. | ~0.5 mb/d |
| Majnoon | Basra, south | Basra Oil Company (state-operated) | ~0.25–0.30 mb/d |
| Zubair | Basra, south | ENI (32.8%) + Occidental + Kogas + Missan Oil Co. | ~0.35–0.40 mb/d |
| Halfaya | Missan, south | TotalEnergies (22.5%) + CNPC + Petronas + Missan Oil Co. | ~0.20–0.25 mb/d |
| Kirkuk | North | North Oil Company (state) | ~0.30–0.35 mb/d |
Iraq's major southern fields use service contracts (not PSAs) — IOCs receive a fixed fee per barrel (typically $1.50–5.00/bbl) rather than equity oil. This structure gives the Iraqi state maximum revenue control but means IOC commercial incentive is pure volume maximisation, not price optimisation.
OPEC+ quota compliance challenges
Iraq's pattern of quota non-compliance is one of OPEC+'s most persistent internal tensions:
- Iraq's nominal OPEC+ quota in 2026: approximately 4.0–4.2 mb/d (after voluntary cut adjustments)
- Actual production: approximately 4.2–4.4 mb/d — consistently 150,000–300,000 b/d above quota
- Compensatory cuts: OPEC+ introduced a "compensation mechanism" requiring over-producers to submit plans to cut in future months to compensate for past overproduction; Iraq has submitted such plans but implementation has been inconsistent
- Diplomatic cost: Saudi Arabia has repeatedly expressed frustration with Iraqi non-compliance; it is one of the key fault lines in OPEC+ cohesion
For the broader OPEC+ strategy context, see our OPEC Seminar 2027 preview and OPEC+ 2027 outlook.
Kurdistan Region oil dispute
The Kurdistan Region oil dispute has significantly affected both Iraqi production accounting and KRG fiscal stability:
- March 2023: ICC arbitration ordered Turkey to pay Iraq $1.5bn for facilitating KRG independent exports via Ceyhan without Baghdad's consent
- The Iraq–Turkey pipeline (capacity ~450,000 b/d) was shut in response; as of 2026, limited volumes have resumed via negotiated interim arrangements
- KRG's fiscal position: approximately 90% of KRG budget revenues came from oil exports; the pipeline shutdown created a severe financial crisis in Erbil, requiring Baghdad budget transfers that the KRG disputes
- Remaining IOC presence: several smaller E&P companies (Genel Energy, DNO, Gulf Keystone) continue operating KRI fields at reduced rates pending export route resolution
Iraq's fiscal pressure and oil dependence
Iraq's fiscal breakeven (~$90–100/bbl Brent) reflects one of the most oil-dependent government budgets in OPEC:
- Oil revenues: ~90% of federal government revenue
- Non-oil GDP: services, agriculture, some manufacturing — but minimal private sector development
- Public sector employment: ~4+ million government employees and pensioners dependent on oil-funded state budget
- Energy transition risk: Iraq has no significant SWF buffer and limited economic diversification — one of the most vulnerable OPEC members to a long-term demand decline scenario
For Iraq's fuel subsidy context, see our fuel subsidy glossary entry. For a comparison with Qatar's stronger fiscal position, see our Qatar fuel prices 2026.
In 2021–2022, Iraq signed a major framework deal with TotalEnergies worth approximately $27bn, covering: (1) development of the Artawi oil field; (2) a 1 GW solar power project; (3) seawater injection at southern fields to maintain reservoir pressure; (4) gas capture at southern flares (Iraq flares approximately 1.5–2.0 bcm/year of associated gas — a significant waste and environmental problem). The deal ties oil revenue to infrastructure investment and gas capture — addressing Iraq's energy paradox where the country is an OPEC producer yet experiences domestic power shortages due to gas flaring and grid infrastructure gaps. Progress on implementation has been slow due to bureaucratic and political challenges. See our global refining outlook 2027 for broader Middle East refining context.
Frequently asked questions
How much oil does Iraq produce in 2026?
- Iraq produces approximately 4.2–4.4 mb/d in 2026 — OPEC's second largest after Saudi Arabia. Major fields: Rumaila (~1.3–1.4 mb/d, BP/CNPC), West Qurna 2 (~0.7–0.8 mb/d, Lukoil), West Qurna 1 (~0.5 mb/d, ExxonMobil/PetroChina), and several southern Basra fields. Iraq consistently produces ~150,000–300,000 b/d above its OPEC+ quota.
Why does Iraq frequently exceed its OPEC+ production quota?
- Iraq's fiscal breakeven (~$90–100/bbl) requires maximum revenue; cutting production means budget deficits. IOC service contracts (BP, Lukoil, ExxonMobil) pay IOCs per barrel — creating pure volume incentive. Kurdistan production accounting is inconsistent. The government's public sector payroll (~4M+ employees/pensioners) makes cuts politically impossible. Compensatory cut plans are submitted but inconsistently implemented.
What is the Kurdistan Region oil dispute?
- The KRG exported oil independently via the Iraq–Turkey pipeline to Ceyhan without Baghdad's consent. A March 2023 ICC ruling ordered Turkey to pay Iraq $1.5bn; the pipeline was shut. ~450,000 b/d of KRG export capacity was lost, creating a severe KRG fiscal crisis. As of 2026, limited interim volumes resume; the underlying dispute over revenue sharing and constitutional authority remains unresolved.