Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)

Definition

A Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) or Production Sharing Contract (PSC) is a legal framework governing the relationship between a host country government and an International Oil Company (IOC) for upstream oil and gas exploration and development. The defining feature is that:

  • The government retains ownership of underground resources at all times
  • The IOC bears exploration and development risk and costs
  • The IOC recovers costs from a portion of production (cost oil), then shares the remaining production (profit oil) with the government

PSAs emerged in the 1960s (Indonesia was the pioneer) as an alternative to traditional concession agreements, which gave IOCs direct ownership of reserves. Newly independent nations and resource nationalists preferred PSAs' structure where the state visibly remains owner of its resources.

For the broader OPEC+ geopolitics context, see our OPEC+ glossary entry. For upstream/downstream industry context, see our upstream-downstream glossary entry. For lifting cost and breakeven economics, see our lifting cost glossary entry.

PSA structure: cost oil and profit oil

ComponentWhat it isTypical terms
Gross productionTotal barrels of oil produced per period100% basis
Royalty (if applicable)First deduction; some PSAs include a royalty payable to government before cost recovery0–15% of gross production
Cost oilPortion allocated to IOC for cost recovery; limited by cost recovery ceiling30–60% of production per period ceiling
Unrecovered costsExcess costs above ceiling carry forward to future periodsCarried at negotiated interest rate or nominal
Profit oilRemaining production after royalty and cost oil; split between IOC and government/NOCSliding scale: IOC 20–60%; Government/NOC 40–80%
Corporate tax (if additional)Some PSAs apply corporate income tax on IOC's profit oil share25–50% depending on jurisdiction

The combination of cost oil recovery, profit oil split, and taxes determines the total government take — the percentage of project economics received by the state. Competitive PSA terms (attractive to IOCs) offer government takes of 60–70%; less competitive terms (resource nationalist or high-risk aversion) may target 80–90%+, reducing IOC incentive to invest.

Major PSA jurisdictions and examples

Country / BlockStructureNotable PSA
Nigeria (offshore)NNPC-NOC + IOC PSCsShell/TotalEnergies/ENI/Chevron deepwater blocks
AngolaSonangol-NOC + IOC PSCsCabinda (Chevron), Block 0; deepwater Blocks 15–18, 31, 32
IndonesiaPertamina + IOC Kontrak Bagi Hasil (KBH)Pioneer PSC model since 1966 (Chevron Caltex, CNOOC)
AzerbaijanSOCAR + IOCAIOC PSA (1994): BP, AzCo, SOCAR for Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli; pioneering post-Soviet PSA
IraqHybrid: service contracts + some PSC elementsBP/CNPC (Rumaila), Lukoil (West Qurna), TotalEnergies (Halfaya)
MozambiqueENH-NOC + IOCTotalEnergies Mozambique LNG (Area 1); ENI Coral FLNG (Area 4)
Russia's Sakhalin PSA disputes
Russia signed two major PSAs in the 1990s — Sakhalin-1 (ExxonMobil, Rosneft, ONGC, SODECO) and Sakhalin-2 (Shell, Gazprom, Mitsui, Mitsubishi) — as exceptions to Russia's normal concession/tax regime. By the 2000s, Russia pressured operators to renegotiate on more favourable terms, using environmental enforcement as leverage. After Russia's 2022 Ukraine invasion, Western companies were forced to exit Sakhalin PSAs with minimal compensation. This illustrates a key PSA risk: political renegotiation or nationalisation in resource nationalist or unstable environments, regardless of contractual terms.

PSA economics and oil production impact

PSA terms significantly affect whether IOCs invest in a country's upstream sector and how much production results:

  • Overly restrictive PSA terms (high government take, low cost recovery ceiling, punitive sliding scales) deter IOC investment, reducing exploration and development activity
  • In high-cost environments (deepwater, Arctic, challenging reservoirs), more IOC-friendly terms are needed to attract investment at all
  • Lower oil prices reduce PSA profitability faster for IOCs than for governments (cost oil recovery takes longer at lower revenue), making PSAs less attractive to IOCs in bear markets
  • At high oil prices, governments often feel PSAs give IOCs windfall profits and push for renegotiation — creating political risk for long-term investments

For crude oil benchmark pricing that underpins PSA economics, see our crude oil benchmarks guide and our Brent crude glossary entry.

Frequently asked questions

What is a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)?
A PSA (Production Sharing Agreement/Contract) governs IOC upstream oil investment in a host country: the IOC bears exploration/development risk and costs; recovers costs from 'cost oil'; then shares 'profit oil' with the government/NOC. Crucially, the government retains resource ownership throughout. PSAs dominate in Africa, Southeast Asia, and former Soviet states.
How does cost oil and profit oil work in a PSA?
Cost oil (typically 30–60% of production ceiling) reimburses the IOC for capital and operating costs. Remaining production is 'profit oil', split between IOC and government via a negotiated sliding scale (e.g., IOC 60% at low production rates, 30% at high rates). Total government take including profit oil + taxes typically = 60–85% of project economics. Cost recovery ceiling and profit oil split are the primary negotiating variables.
Where are production sharing agreements used?
PSAs dominate in: Africa (Nigeria offshore, Angola, Mozambique LNG), Southeast Asia (Indonesia — the pioneer since 1966, Malaysia, Vietnam), former Soviet states (Azerbaijan AIOC PSA 1994, Russia Sakhalin-1/2). Less common in Gulf OPEC producers (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) which use concession agreements or full state ownership. PSAs are rare in the USA, Canada, UK, and Norway which use taxation/royalty concession frameworks.