Gulf Intelligence Energy Forum 2024 — GCC energy transition, hydrogen exports, and oil revenue diversification

Post-COP28 positioning

The forum's opening sessions were dominated by interpretation of the COP28 outcome — specifically the UAE Consensus text calling for a "transition away from fossil fuels." GCC ministers were at pains to distinguish between "transition away" (which they accepted) and "phase out" (which they had successfully negotiated out of the final text). The UAE Ministry of Climate Change and Environment presented the outcome as a vindication of the "pragmatic transition" model.

Saudi Arabia's energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, speaking via video, reiterated that the kingdom would continue expanding oil and gas capacity while simultaneously investing in renewables, carbon capture, and efficiency. The argument — that the world needs both the transition and continued oil supply during it — was the central GCC narrative at the forum and connects directly to the COP28 debate on fossil fuel language.

Saudi Aramco's CEO Amin Nasser used an adjacent forum appearance to repeat his argument that the oil demand peak narrative was "a fantasy" and that under-investment in upstream was the more pressing risk — a position that directly contradicts the IEA NZE 2050 roadmap.

Hydrogen export ambitions

All three major GCC producers — Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman — presented hydrogen export visions at the forum. The strategic logic is clear: if oil and gas demand declines over the next two decades, GCC countries with cheap renewable energy (solar in the Gulf is among the world's lowest cost at USD 1.5–2.0 cents/kWh) and existing hydrocarbon infrastructure want to pivot to hydrogen exports before their incumbent advantage erodes.

Saudi Arabia's NEOM green hydrogen project — a joint venture of ACWA Power, Air Products, and NEOM — targets 600 tonnes per day of green ammonia (hydrogen carrier) for export, powered by 4 GW of solar and wind. The USD 8.4 billion project faced cost overrun and timeline questions at the forum; delegates noted that green hydrogen at scale remained expensive and required committed off-take agreements with importing countries.

Oman's Duqm hydrogen project, backed by OQ and international partners, is developing 1 GW of electrolysis capacity targeting European and Asian buyers. The IRENA renewable cost data underpins the GCC's solar cost advantage. For the economics of hydrogen as a transport fuel, see our hydrogen fuel economics article.

Solar power and domestic energy

A less-discussed but strategically significant aspect of GCC energy transition is domestic renewable deployment. The UAE's Masdar has become one of the world's largest renewable energy developers, with projects in 40+ countries. Abu Dhabi's Al Dhafra Solar PV project (2.1 GW) achieved a record-low tariff of USD 1.35 cents/kWh at auction — a landmark that has been cited globally as proof of the Gulf's solar advantage.

Domestically, replacing natural gas in power generation with solar frees gas for export (as LNG) or petrochemical feedstock — the so-called "green the blue" strategy. Saudi Aramco and SABIC benefit from cheap gas feedstock, and expanding domestic solar capacity protects that advantage. Saudi Arabia's National Renewable Energy Programme targets 50 % of electricity from renewables by 2030, up from under 5 % in 2023.

Subsidy reform trajectory

GCC fuel subsidies were a recurring topic. The IMF's GCC country articles estimate combined explicit fuel subsidies at USD 50–80 billion annually across the six GCC states. The UAE's decision in 2015 to link petrol prices to the international market (reviewed monthly by the Fuel Price Committee) was highlighted as a model — UAE pump prices now closely track Brent crude, giving drivers a direct signal of market conditions. Saudi Arabia's 2016 price increases (petrol up 67 %) and 2018 further increases have moved prices in the right direction but remain below import parity.

Bahrain and Oman — which face tighter fiscal positions than Saudi Arabia or the UAE — have made the most progress on subsidy rationalisation, partly under IMF programme conditionality. Kuwait and Qatar, with the largest sovereign wealth funds relative to GDP, have the least fiscal urgency to reform. See our Middle East fuel prices article for country-by-country pricing data and subsidy context.

Revenue diversification reality check

Saudi Vision 2030 aims for non-oil GDP to reach 50 % of total by 2030. A frank panel at the forum examined progress. Tourism (particularly the Red Sea project, Diriyah Gate, and events like Formula 1) is growing rapidly. Non-oil manufacturing and financial services are expanding. But the fiscal reality is that Saudi Arabia's breakeven oil price for the 2024 national budget was estimated at USD 80–90/bbl — meaning the government still needs oil at or above current levels to fund Vision 2030 itself.

This creates a structural paradox that was openly acknowledged at the forum: Vision 2030's diversification is funded by oil revenue, which requires maintaining oil prices — which requires OPEC+ production discipline — which is in tension with the long-term demand decline that makes diversification necessary. For the OPEC+ production strategy dimension of this, see our OPEC International Seminar 2024 coverage and the OPEC+ cuts article.